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Abstract
Can neoclassical theory account for the Great Depression in the United States—
both the downturn in output between 1929 and 1933 and the recovery between
1934 and 1939? Yes and no. Given the large real and monetary shocks to the U.S.
economy during 1929–33, neoclassical theory does predict a long, deep downturn.
However, theory predicts a much different recovery from this downturn than
actually occurred. Given the period’s sharp increases in total factor productivity
and the money supply and the elimination of deﬂation and bank failures, theory
predicts an extremely rapid recovery that returns output to trend around 1936. In
sharp contrast, real output remained between 25 and 30 percent below trend
through the late 1930s. We conclude that a new shock is needed to account for the
Depression’s weak recovery. A likely culprit is New Deal policies toward monop-
oly and the distribution of income.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Between 1929 and 1933, employment fell about 25 per-
cent and output fell about 30 percent in the United States.
By 1939, employment and output remained well below
their 1929 levels. Why did employment and output fall so
much in the early 1930s? Why did they remain so low a
decade later?
In this article, we address these two questions by eval-
uating macroeconomic performance in the United States
from1929to1939.Thisperiodconsistsofadeclineineco-
nomic activity (1929–33) followed by a recovery (1934–
39). Our deﬁnition of the Great Depression as a 10-year
event differs from the standard deﬁnition of the Great De-
pression, which is the 1929–33 decline. We deﬁne the De-
pression this way because employment and output re-
mained well below their 1929 levels in 1939.
We examine the Depression from the perspective of
neoclassicalgrowththeory.Byneoclassicalgrowththeory,
we mean the optimal growth model in Cass 1965 and
Koopmans1965augmentedwithvariousshocksthatcause
employment and output to deviate from their deterministic
steady-state paths as in Kydland and Prescott 1982.
1
We use neoclassical growth theory to study macroeco-
nomic performance during the 1930s the way other econ-
omists have used the theory to study postwar business cy-
cles. We ﬁrst identify a set of shocks considered important
in postwar economic declines: technology shocks, ﬁscal
policyshocks,tradeshocks,andmonetaryshocks.Wethen
ask whether those shocks, within the neoclassical frame-
work, can account for the decline and the recovery in the
1930s. This method allows us to understand which data
fromthe1930sareconsistentwithneoclassicaltheoryand,
especially, which observations are puzzling from the neo-
classical perspective.
In our analysis, we treat the 1929–33 decline as a long
and severe recession.
2But the neoclassical approach to an-
alyzing businesscycles is notjust to assessdeclines ineco-
nomic activity, but to assess recoveries as well. When we
comparethedeclineandrecoveryduringtheDepressionto
a typical postwar business cycle, we see striking differ-
ences in duration and scale. The decline, as well as the re-
covery, during the Depression lasted about four times as
long as the postwar business cycle average. Moreover, the
size of the decline in output in the 1930s was about 10
times the size of the average decline. (See Table 1.)
What factors were responsible for these large differ-
ences in the duration and scale of the Depression? One
possibility is that the shocks—the unexpected changes in
technology, preferences, endowments, or government pol-
icies that lead output to deviate from its existing steady-
state growth path—were different in the 1930s. One view
isthat theshocksresponsible forthe1929–33declinewere
much larger and more persistent versions of the same
shocks that are important in shorter and milder declines.
Anotherviewisthatthetypesofshocksresponsibleforthe
1929–33 decline were fundamentally different from those
considered to be the driving factors behind typical cyclical
declines.
To evaluate these two distinct views, we analyze data
from the 1930s using the neoclassical growth model. Our
main ﬁnding differs from the standard view that the most
puzzling aspect of the Depression is the large decline be-
tween 1929 and 1933. We ﬁnd that while it may be pos-
sible to account for the 1929–33 decline on the basis of the
shocks we consider, none of those shocks can account for
the 1934–39 recovery. Theory predicts large increases in
employment and output beginning in 1934 that return real
economic activity rapidly to trend. This prediction stands
in sharp contrast to the data, suggesting to us that we need
a new shock to account for the weak recovery.
We begin our study by examining deviations in output
and inputs fromthe trendgrowth that theorypredicts inthe
absence of any shocks to the economy. This examination
not only highlights the severity of the economic decline
between1929and1933,butalsoraisesquestionsaboutthe
recoverythatbeganin1934.In1939,realpercapitaoutput
remained 11 percent below its 1929 level: output increases
an average of 21 percent during a typical 10-year period.
This contrast identiﬁes two challenges for theory: account-
ing for the large decline in economic activity that occurred
between 1929 and 1933 and accounting for the weak re-
covery between 1934 and 1939.
We ﬁrst evaluate the importance of real shocks—tech-
nology shocks, ﬁscal policy shocks, and trade shocks—for
this decade-long period. We ﬁnd that technology shocks
may have contributed to the 1929–33 decline. However,
we ﬁnd that the real shocks predict a very robust recovery
beginningin1934.Theorysuggeststhatrealshocksshould
have led employment and output to return to trend by
1939.
We next analyze whether monetary shocks can account
for the decline and recovery. Some economists, such as
FriedmanandSchwartz(1963),arguethatmonetaryshocks
were a key factor in the 1929–33 decline. To analyze the
monetary shock view, we use the well-known model of
Lucas and Rapping (1969), which connects changes in the
money supply to changes in output through intertemporal
substitution of leisure and unexpected changes in wages.
The Lucas-Rapping model predicts that monetary shocks
reduced output in the early 1930s, but the model also pre-
dicts that employment and output should have been back
near trend by the mid-1930s.
Both real shocks and monetary shocks predict that em-
ployment and output should have quickly returned to trend
levels. These predictions are difficult to reconcile with the
weak 1934–39 recovery. If the factors considered impor-
tant in postwar ﬂuctuations can’t fully account for macro-
economicperformance inthe1930s,are thereotherfactors
that can? We go on to analyze two other factors that some
economists consider important in understanding the De-
pression: ﬁnancial intermediation shocks and inﬂexible
nominalwages.Onetypeofﬁnancialintermediationshock
is the bank failures that occurred during the early 1930s.
Some researchers argue that these failures reduced output
by disrupting ﬁnancial intermediation. While bank failures
perhaps deepened the decline, we argue that their impact
would have been short-lived and, consequently, that bank
failures were not responsible for the weak recovery. An-
othertypeofﬁnancialintermediationshockistheincreases
inreserverequirementsthatoccurredinlate1936andearly
1937. While this change may have led to a small decline
in output in 1937, it cannot account for the weak recovery
prior to 1937 and cannot account for the signiﬁcant drop
in activity in 1939 relative to 1929.
Theotheralternativefactorisinﬂexiblenominalwages.
The view of this factor holds that nominal wages were not
as ﬂexible as prices and that the fall in the price levelraised real wages and reduced employment. We present
data showing that manufacturing real wages rose consis-
tently during the 1930s, but that nonmanufacturing wages
fell. The 10-year increase in manufacturing wages is dif-
ﬁcult to reconcile with nominal wage inﬂexibility, which
typically assumes that inﬂexibility is due to either money
illusion or explicit nominal contracts. The long duration of
the Depression casts doubt on both of these determinants
of inﬂexible nominal wages.
The weak recovery is a puzzle from the perspective of
neoclassical growth theory. Our inability to account for the
recovery with these shocks suggests to us that an alterna-
tive shock is important for understanding macroeconomic
performance after 1933. We conclude our study by con-
jecturing that government policies toward monopoly and
the distribution of income are a good candidate for this
shock. The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of
1933 allowed much of the economy to cartelize. This pol-
icy change would have depressed employment and output
in those sectors covered by the act and, consequently, have
led to a weak recovery. Whether the NIRA can quantita-
tively account for the weak recovery is an open question
for future research.
The Data Through the Lens of the Theory
Neoclassical growth theory has two cornerstones: the ag-
gregate production technology, which describes how labor
and capital services are combined to create output, and the
willingness and ability of households to substitute com-
moditiesovertime,whichgovernhowhouseholdsallocate
their time between market and nonmarket activities and
how households allocate their income between consump-
tion and savings. Viewed through the lens of this theory,
the following variables are keys to understanding macro-
economic performance: the allocation of output between
consumption and investment, the allocation of time (labor




In Table 2, we compare levels of output during the De-
pression to peak levels in 1929. To do this, we present data
on consumption and investment and the other components
of real gross national product (GNP) for the 1929–39 pe-
riod.
4 Data are from the national income and product ac-
counts published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of
theU.S.DepartmentofCommerce.Alldataaredividedby
the working-age (16 years and older) population. Since
neoclassical growth theory indicates that these variables
can be expected to grow, on average, at the trend rate of
technology, they are also detrended, that is, adjusted for
trend growth.
5 With these adjustments, the data can be di-
rectly compared to their peak values in 1929.
As we can see in Table 2, all the components of real
output (GNP in base-year prices), except government pur-
chases of goods and services, fell considerably during the
1930s. The general pattern for the declining series is a
very large drop between 1929 and 1933 followed by only
a moderate rise from the 1933 trough. Output fell more
than 38 percent between 1929 and 1933. By 1939, output
remained nearly 27 percent below its 1929 detrended lev-
el. This detrended decline of 27 percent consists of a raw
11 percent drop in per capita output and a further 16 per-
cent drop representing trend growth that would have nor-
mally occurred over the 1929–39 period.
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The largest decline in economic activity occurred in
business investment, which fell nearly 80 percent between
1929 and 1933. Consumer durables, which represent
household, as opposed to business, investment, followed
a similar pattern, declining more than 55 percent between
1929 and 1933. Consumption of nondurables and services
declined almost 29 percent between 1929 and 1933. For-
eign trade (exports and imports) also fell considerably be-
tween 1929 and 1933. The impact of the decline between
1929 and 1933 on government purchases was relatively
mild, and government spending even rose above its trend
level in 1930 and 1931.
Table 2 also makes clear that the economy did not re-
cover much from the 1929–33 decline. Although invest-
mentimprovedrelativetoits1933troughlevel,investment
remained 51 percent below its 1929 (detrended) level in
1939. Consumer durables remained 36 percent belowtheir
1929 level in 1939. Relative to trend, consumption of non-
durables and services increased very little during the re-
covery. In 1933, consumption was about 28 percent below
its 1929 detrended level. By 1939, consumption remained
about 25 percent below this level.
These unique and large changes in economic activity
during the Depression also changed the composition of
output—the shares of output devoted to consumption, in-
vestment,governmentpurchases, andexportsandimports.
These data are presented in Table 3. The share of output
consumed rose considerably during the early 1930s, while
the share of output invested, including consumer durables,
declined sharply, falling from 25 percent in 1929 to just 8
percent in 1932. During the 1934–39 recovery, the share
ofoutputdevotedtoinvestmentaveragedabout15percent,
compared to its postwar average of 20 percent. This low
rate of investment led to a decline in the capital stock—the
gross stock of ﬁxed reproducible private capital declined
more than 6 percent between 1929 and 1939, representing
a decline of more than 25 percent relative to trend. Foreign
trade comprised a small share of economic activity in the
UnitedStatesduringthe1929–39period.Bothexportsand
imports accounted for about 4 percent of output during the
decade. The increase in government purchases, combined
with the decrease in output, increased the government’s
share of output from 13 percent to about 20 percent by
1939.
These data raise the possibility that the recovery was a
weak one. To shed some light on this possibility, in Table
4, we show the recovery from a typical postwar recession.
The data in Table 4 are average detrended levels relative
topeakmeasured quarterlyfromthetrough.Acomparison
of Tables 2 and 4 shows that the recovery from a typical
postwar recession differs considerably from the 1934–39
recovery during the Depression. First, output rapidly re-
covers to trend following a typical postwar recession. Sec-
ond, consumption grows smoothly following a typical
postwar recession. This contrasts sharply to the ﬂat time
path of consumption during the 1934–39 recovery. Third,
investment recovers very rapidly following a typical post-
war recession. Despite falling much more than output dur-
ing a recession, investment recovers to a level comparable
to the output recovery level within three quarters after the
trough. During the Depression, however, the recovery ininvestment was much slower, remaining well below the
recovery in output.
Tables 2 and 4 indicate that the 1934–39 recovery was
much weaker than the recovery from a typical recession.
One interpretation of the weak 1934–39 recovery is that
the economy was not returning to its pre-1929 steady-state
growth path, but was settling on a considerably lower
steady-state growth path.
The possibility that the economy was converging to a
lower steady-state growth path is consistent with the fact
that consumption fell about 25 percent below trend by
1933 and remained near that level for the rest of the de-
cade. (See Chart 1.) Consumption is a good barometer of
a possible change in the economy’s steady state because
household dynamic optimization implies that all future ex-




Data on labor input are presented in Table 5. We use
Kendrick’s (1961) data on labor input, capital input, pro-
ductivity, and output.
8 We present ﬁve measures of labor
input, each divided by the working-age population. We
don’t detrend these ratios because theory implies that they
will be constant along the steady-state growth path.
9 Here,
again, data are expressed relative to their 1929 values.
The three aggregate measures of labor input declined
sharply from 1929 to 1933. Total employment, which con-
sistsofprivateandgovernmentworkers,declinedabout24
percent between 1929 and 1933 and remained 18 percent
below its 1929 level in 1939. Total hours, which reﬂect
changes in employment and changes in hours per worker,
declined more sharply than total employment, and the
trough didn’t occur until 1934. Total hours remained 21
percent below their 1929 level in 1939. Private hours,
which don’t include the hours of government workers, de-
clined more sharply than totalhours, reﬂecting the factthat
government employment did not fall during the 1930s.
Private hours fell more than 25 percent between 1929 and
1939.
These large declines in aggregate labor input reﬂect
different changes across sectors of the economy. Farm
hours and manufacturing hours are shown in the last two
columns of Table 5. In addition to being divided by the
working-age population, the farm hours measure is adjust-
ed for an annual secular decline in farm employment of
about 1.8 percent per year. In contrast to the other mea-
suresoflaborinput,farmhoursremainedneartrendduring
much of the decade. Farm hours were virtually unchanged
between 1929 and 1933, a period in which hours worked
in other sectors fell sharply. Farm hours did fall about 10
percent in 1934 and were about 7 percent below their 1929
level by 1939. A very different picture emerges for manu-
facturing hours, which plummeted more than 40 percent
between 1929 and 1933 and remained 22 percent below
their detrended 1929 level at the end of the decade.
These data indicate important differences between the
farm and manufacturing sectors during the Depression.
Why didn’t farm hours decline more during the Depres-
sion? Why did manufacturing hours decline so much?
Finally,note thatthechangesin nonfarmlaborinputare
similar to changes in consumption during the 1930s. In
particular, after falling sharply between 1929 and 1933,
measures of labor input remained well below 1929 levels
in 1939. Thus, aggregate labor input data also suggest that
the economy was settling on a growth path lower than the
path the economy was on in 1929.
Productivity
In Table 6, we present two measures of productivity: labor
productivity (output per hour) and total factor productivity.
Both measures are detrended and expressed relative to
1929 measures. These two series show similar changes
during the 1930s. Labor productivity and total factor pro-
ductivity both declined sharply in 1932 and 1933, falling
about 12 percent and 14 percent, respectively, below their
1929 detrended levels. After 1933, however, both mea-
sures rose quickly relative to trend and, in fact, returned to
trend by 1936. When we compare 1939 data to 1929 data,
we see that the 1930s were a decade of normal productivi-
ty growth. Labor productivity grew more than 22 percent
between 1929 and 1939, and total factor productivity grew
more than 20 percent in the same period. This normal
growth in productivity raises an important question about
the lack of a recovery in hours worked, consumption, and
investment. In the absence of a large negative shift in the
long-run path of productivity, why would the economy be
on a lower steady-state growth path in 1939?
An International Comparison
Many countries suffered economic declines during the
1930s; however, there are two important distinctions be-
tween economic activity in the United States and other
countries during the 1930s. The decline in the United
States was much more severe, and the recovery from the
decline was weaker. To see this, we examine average real
per capita output relative to its 1929 level for Belgium,
Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Sweden. The
data are from Maddison 1991 and are normalized for each
country so that per capita output is equal to 100 in 1929.
Since there is some debate over the long-run growth rate
in some of these countries, we have not detrended the data.
Table 7 shows the U.S. data and the mean of the nor-
malized data for other countries. The total drop in output
is relatively small in other countries: an 8.7 percent drop
compared to a 33.3 percent drop in the United States. The
international economies recovered quickly: output in most
countries returned to 1929 levels by 1935 and was above
those levels by 1938. Employment also generally recov-
ered to its 1929 level by 1938.
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While accounting for other countries’ economic de-
clines is beyond the scope of this analysis, we can draw
two conclusions from this comparison. First, the larger de-
cline in the United States is consistent with the view that
the shocks that caused the decline in the United States
were larger than the shocks that caused the decline in the
other countries. Second, the weak recovery in the United
States is consistent with the view that the shocks that im-
peded the U.S. recovery did not affect most other coun-
tries. Instead, the post-1933 shock seems to be largely spe-
ciﬁc to the United States.
The data we’ve examined so far suggest that inputs and
output in the United States fell considerably during the
1930s and did not recover much relative to the increase in
productivity. Moreover, the data show that the decline was
much more severe and the recovery weaker in the United
States than in other countries. To account for the decade-
long Depression in the United States, we conclude that weshouldfocusondomestic,ratherthaninternational,factors.
We turn to this task in the next section.
Can Real Shocks Account for the Depression?
Neoclassical theory and the data have implications for the
plausibility of different sources of real shocks in account-
ing for the Depression. Since the decline in output was so
large and persistent, we will look for large and persistent
negative shocks. We analyze three classes of real shocks
consideredimportantintypicalbusinesscycleﬂuctuations:
technology shocks, ﬁscal policy shocks, and trade shocks.
Technology Shocks? Perhaps Initially
First we consider technology shocks, deﬁned as any exog-
enous factor that changes the efficiency with which busi-
ness enterprises transform inputs into output. Under this
broad deﬁnition of technology shocks, changes in produc-
tivity reﬂect not only true changes in technology, but also
such other factors as changes in work rules and practices
or government regulations that affect the efficiency of pro-
ductionbutareexogenousfromtheperspectiveofbusiness
enterprises.Howdotechnologyshocksaffecteconomicac-
tivity? The key element that leads to a decline in economic
activity in models with technology shocks is a negative
shock that reduces the marginal products of capital and la-
bor. Shocks that reduce the efficiency of transforming in-
putsintooutputleadhouseholdstosubstituteoutofmarket
activities into nonmarket activities and result in lower out-
put. Recent research has identiﬁed these shocks as impor-
tant factors in postwar business cycle ﬂuctuations. Prescott
(1986), for example, shows that a standard one-sector neo-
classical model with a plausibly parameterized stochastic
process for technology shocks can account for 70 percent
of postwar business cycle ﬂuctuations. Can technology
shocks account for the Depression?
If these shocks were responsible, we should see a large
and persistent drop in technology—the efficiency of trans-
forming inputs into output—during the 1930s. To see if
such a drop occurred, we ﬁrst need a measure of technol-
ogy for this period. Under the neoclassical assumptions of
constant returns to scale in production and perfectly com-
petitive markets, theory implies that changes in total factor
productivity are measures of changes in technology. The
data do show a drop in total factor productivity—a 14 per-
cent (detrended) drop between 1929 and 1933 followed by
a rapid recovery. What is the quantitative importance of
these changes in accounting for the Depression?
To address this question, we present the prediction for
output for 1930–39 from a real business cycle model. (See
Hansen 1985, Prescott 1986, or King, Plosser, and Rebelo
1988foradiscussionofthismodel.)Ourmodelconsistsof
equations (A1)–(A5) and (A9) in the Appendix, along
with the following preference speciﬁcation:
(1) u(ct,lt) = log(ct)+A log(lt).






The household has one unit of time available each period:
(3) 1 = lt + nt.
And we use the following speciﬁcation of the stochastic
process for the technology shock:
(4) zt = (1−r)+rzt−1 + et, et ~ N(0,s
2).
With values for the parameters of the model, we can use
numerical methods to compute an approximate solution to
the equilibrium of this economy.
11 We set q = 0.33 to con-
form to the observation that capital income is about one-
third of output. We set s = 1.7 percent and r = 0.9 to con-
form to the observed standard deviation and serial correla-
tion of total factor productivity. We choose the value for
the parameter A so that households spend about one-third
of their discretionary time working in the deterministic
steady state. Labor-augmenting technological change (xt)
grows at a rate of 1.9 percent per year. The population(nt)
grows at a rate of 1 percent per year. We set the deprecia-
tion rate at 10 percent per year.
We conduct the analysis by assuming that the capital
stock in 1929 is equal to its steady-state value, and then we
feed in the sequence of observed levels of total factor pro-
ductivity as measures of the technology shock. Given the
initialconditionandthetimepathoftechnology,themodel
predicts labor input, output, consumption, and investment
for each year during the 1930s. We summarize the results
of the analysis in Chart 2, where we plot the detrended
predicted level of output from the model between 1929
and 1939. For comparison, we also plot the actual detrend-
ed level of output. Note that the model predicts a signiﬁ-
cant decline in output between 1929 and 1933, although
the decline is not as large as the observed decline in the
data: a 15 percent predicted decline compared to a 38 per-
cent actual decline. Further, note that as a consequence of
rapid growth in total factor productivity after 1934, the
model predicts a rapid recovery: output should have re-
turnedtotrendby1936.Incontrast,actualoutputremained
about 25 percent below trend during the recovery.
One factor that may be contributing to the rapid recov-
ery in the model is the fact that the capital stock in the
model falls less than in the data. Consequently, output pre-
dicted by the model may be relatively high because the
capital stock is high. To correct for this difference, we con-
duct another analysis in which we also feed in the se-
quence of total factor productivity measures between 1934
and 1939, but we use the actual capital stock in 1934 (20
percentbelowtrend)astheinitialconditionfor1934.Chart
3 shows that this change reduces output predicted by the
model by about 3 percent at the beginning of the recovery.
But because the initial capital stock in this analysis is low-
er, the marginal product of capital is higher, and the pre-
dicted rate of output growth in the recovery is faster than
in the ﬁrst analysis. This recovery brings output back to its
trend level by 1937. The predicted output level is about 27
percent above the actual data level in 1939.
12 Thus, the
predicted recovery is stronger than the actual recovery be-
cause predicted labor input is much higher than actual la-
bor input.
Based on measured total factor productivity during the
Depression, our analysis suggests a mixed assessment of
thetechnologyshockview.Onthenegativeside,theactual
slow recovery after 1933 is at variance with the rapid re-
covery predicted by the theory. Thus, it appears that some
shock other than to the efficiency of production is impor-tant for understanding the weak recovery between 1934
and 1939. On the positive side, however, the theory pre-
dicts thatthemeasureddrop intotalfactorproductivitycan
account for about 40 percent of the decline in output be-
tween 1929 and 1933.
Note, however, one caveat in using total factor pro-
ductivity as a measure of technology shocks during pe-
riods of sharp changes in output, such as the 1929–33
decline: An imperfect measurement of capital input can
affect measured aggregate total factor productivity. Be-
cause total factor productivity change is deﬁned as the
percentage change in output minus the percentage change
in inputs, overstating the inputs will understate productivi-
ty, while understating the inputs will overstate productivi-
ty. During the 1929–33 decline, some capital was left idle.
The standard measure of capital input is the capital stock.
Because this standard measure includes idle capital, it is
possible that capital input was overstated during the de-
cline and, consequently, that productivity growth was un-
derstated.
13 Although there are no widely accepted mea-
sures of capital input adjusted for changes in utilization,
this caveat raises the possibility that the decline in aggre-
gate total factor productivity in the early 1930s partially
reﬂects mismeasurement of capital input.
14 Without better
data on capital input or an explicit theoretical framework
we can use to adjust observed measured total factor pro-
ductivity ﬂuctuations for capital utilization, we can’t easily
measure how large technology shocks were in the early
1930s and, consequently, how much of a drop in output
technology shocks can account for.
It is important to note here that these results give us an
important gauge not only for the technology shock view,
but also for any other shock which ceased to be operative
after 1933. The predicted rapid recovery in the second ex-
periment implies that any shock which ceased to be op-
erative after 1933 can’t easily account for the weak re-
covery.
Fiscal Policy Shocks? A Little
Nextweconsiderﬁscalpolicyshocks—changesingovern-
ment purchases or tax rates. Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992) argue that government purchase shocks are impor-
tant in understanding postwar business cycle ﬂuctuations,
and Braun (1994) and McGrattan (1994) argue that shocks
to distorting taxes have had signiﬁcant effects on postwar
cyclical activity.
To understand how government purchases affect eco-
nomicactivity,consideranunexpecteddecreaseingovern-
ment purchases. This decrease will tend to increase private
consumption and, consequently, lower the marginal rate of
substitutionbetweenconsumptionandleisure.Theorypre-
dicts that this will lead households to work less and take
more leisure. Conversely, consider an increase in govern-
ment purchases. This increase will tend to decrease private
consumption and reduce the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure. In this case, theory pre-
dicts that this will lead households to work more and take
less leisure.
Historically,changesingovernmentpurchaseshavehad
large effects on economic activity. Ohanian (1997) shows
that the increase in government purchases during World
War II can account for much of the 60 percent increase in
output during the 1940s. Can changes in government pur-
chasesalsoaccountforthedecreaseinoutputinthe1930s?
If government purchase shocks were a key factor in the
decline in employment and output in the 1930s, govern-
ment purchases should have declined considerably during
the period. This did not occur. Government purchases de-
clined modestly between 1929 and 1933 and then rose
sharply during the rest of the decade, rising about 12 per-
cent above trend by 1939. These data are inconsistent with
the view that government purchase shocks were responsi-
ble for the downturn.
15
Although changes in government purchases are not
important in accounting for the Depression, the way they
were ﬁnanced may be. Government purchases are largely
ﬁnancedbydistortingtaxes—taxesthataffectthemarginal
conditions of households or ﬁrms. Most government rev-
enue is raised by taxing factor incomes. Changes in factor
income taxes change the net rental price of the factor. In-
creasesinlaborandcapitalincometaxesreducethereturns
to these factors and, thus, can lead households to substitute
out of taxed activities by working and saving less.
If changes in factor income taxes were a key factor in
the 1930s economy, these rates should have increased con-
siderably in the 1930s. Tax rates on both labor and capital
changed very little during the 1929–33 decline, but rose
during the rest of the decade. Joines (1981) calculates that
between 1929 and 1939, the average marginal tax rate on
labor income increasedfrom 3.5 percent to8.3 percent and
the average marginal tax rate on capital income increased
from 29.5 percent to 42.5 percent. How much should these
increases have depressed economic activity? To answer
this question, we consider a deterministic version of the
model we used earlier to analyze the importance of tech-
nology shocks. We augment this model to allow for dis-
tortionary taxes on labor and capital income. The values of
the other parameters are the same. We then compare the
deterministic steady state of the model with 1939 tax rates
to thedeterministic steadystate of themodel with1929 tax
rates. With these differences in tax rates, we ﬁnd that
steady-state labor input falls by 4 percent. This suggests
that ﬁscal policy shocks account for only about 20 percent
of the weak 1934–39 recovery.
Trade Shocks? No
Finally, we consider trade shocks. In the late 1920s and
early 1930s, tariffs—domestic taxes on foreign goods—
rose in the United States and in other countries. Tariffs
raise the domestic price of foreign goods and, consequent-
ly, beneﬁt domestic producers of goods that are substitutes
with the taxed foreign goods. Theory predicts that in-
creases in tariffs lead to a decline in world trade. Interna-
tionaltrade did,indeed,fallconsiderably duringthe1930s:
the League of Nations (1933) reports that world trade fell
about65percentbetween1929and1932. Werethesetariff
increases responsible for the 1929–33 decline?
To address this question, we ﬁrst study how a contrac-
tion of international trade can lead to a decline in output.
In the United States, trade is a small fraction of output and
is roughly balanced between exports and imports. Lucas
(1994) argues that a country with a small trade share will
not be affected much by changes in trade. Based on the
small share of trade at the time, Lucas (1994, p. 13) argues
that the quantitative effects of the world trade contraction
during the 1930s are likely to have been “trivial.”
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Can trade have an important effect even if the trade
share is small? Crucini and Kahn (1996) argue that a sig-niﬁcant fraction of imports during the 1930s were inter-
mediate inputs. If imported intermediate inputs are imper-
fect substitutes with domestic intermediate inputs, produc-
tion can fall as a result of a reduction in imported inputs.
Quantitatively, the magnitude of the fall is determined by
the elasticity of substitution between the inputs. If the
goods are poor substitutes, then a reduction in trade can
have sizable effects. Little information is available regard-
ing the substitution elasticity between these goods during
the Depression. The preferred estimates of this elasticity
in the postwar United States are between one and two.
(See Stern, Francis, and Schumacher 1976.) Crucini and
Kahn (1996) assume an elasticity of two-thirds and report
that output would have dropped about 2 percent during
the early 1930s as a result of higher tariffs.
This small decline implies that extremely low substitu-
tion elasticities are required if the trade disruption is to
account for more than a small fraction of the decline in
output. How plausible are very low elasticities? The fact
that tariffs were widely used points to high, rather than
low, elasticities between inputs. To see this, note that with
high elasticities, domesticand foreign goods are verygood
substitutes,and,consequently,tariffsshouldbeneﬁtdomes-
tic producers who compete with foreign producers. With
very low elasticities, however, domestic goods and foreign
goods are poor substitutes. In this case, tariffs provide little
beneﬁt to domestic producers and, in fact, can even hurt
domestic producers if there are sufficient complementari-
ties between inputs. This suggests that tariffs would not be
used much if substitution elasticities were very low.
But even if substitution elasticities were low, it is un-
likely that this factor was responsible for the Depression,
because the rise in the prices of tariffed goods would ul-
timately have led domestic producers to begin producing
the imported inputs. Once these inputs became available
domestically, the decline in output created by the tariff
would have been reversed. It is hard to see how the dis-
ruptionoftradecouldhaveaffectedoutputsigniﬁcantlyfor
morethanthepresumablyshortperiod itwouldhavetaken
domestic producers to change their production.
Our analysis thus far suggests that none of the real
shocksusuallyconsideredimportantinunderstandingbusi-
ness cycle ﬂuctuations can account for macroeconomic
performance during the 1930s. Lacking an understanding
of the Depression based on real shocks, we next examine
the effects of monetary shocks from the neoclassical per-
spective.
Can Monetary Shocks Account
for the Depression?
Monetary shocks—unexpected changes in the stock of
money—are considered an alternative to real shocks for
understandingbusinesscycles,andmanyeconomiststhink
monetary shockswere a key factorin the 1929–33decline.
Much of the attraction to monetary shocks as a source of
businesscyclescomes fromtheinﬂuentialnarrative mone-
taryhistoryoftheUnitedStatesbyFriedmanandSchwartz
(1963). They present evidence that declines in the money
supply tend to precede declines in output over nearly a
century in the United States. They also show that the mon-
ey supply fell sharply during the 1929–33 decline. Fried-
man and Schwartz (1963, pp. 300–301) conclude from
these data that the decline in the money supply during the
1930s was an important cause of the 1929–33 decline
(contraction):
The contraction is in fact a tragic testimonial to the impor-
tance of monetary forces....Prevention or moderation of
the decline in the stock of money, let alone the substitution of
monetary expansion, would have reduced the contraction’s
severity and almost as certainly its duration.
Maybe for the Decline...
We begin our discussion of the monetary shock view of
the decline by presenting data on some nominal and real
variables. We present the data Friedman and Schwartz
(1963) focus on: money, prices, and output. We also pre-
sent data on interest rates.
In Table 8, we present the nominal data: the monetary
base, which is the monetary aggregate controlled by the
FederalReserve;M1,whichiscurrencypluscheckablede-
posits; the GNP deﬂator, or price level; and two interest
rates: the rate on three-month U.S. Treasury bills and the
rate on commercial paper. The money supply data are ex-
pressed in per capita terms by dividing by the working-age
population. The money data are also expressed relative to
their 1929 values. The interest rates are the annual average
percentage rates. These nominal data do, indeed, show the
large decline in M1 in the early 1930s that led Friedman
and Schwartz (1963) to conclude that the drop in the mon-
ey supply was an important cause of the 1929–33 de-
cline.17
In Table 9, we present the real data: the real money
supply, which is the two nominal series divided by the
GNP deﬂator; real output; and the ex post real rate of in-
terest, which is the commercial paper rate minus the re-
alized inﬂation rate. Note that the real money stock fell
considerably less than the nominal stock during the early
1930s and then rose between 1933 and 1939. In fact, the
variationintherealmoneystockduringthedeclineisquite
similar to the variation in real output.
To understand the empirical relationship between mon-
ey and output reported by Friedman and Schwartz (1963),
economistshavedevelopedtheoreticalmodelsofmonetary
business cycles. In these models, money is nonneutral—
changesinthemoneysupplyleadtochangesinallocations
and relative prices. For money to have important nonneu-
tralities,theremustbesomemechanismthatpreventsnom-
inal prices from adjusting fully to a change in the money
supply. The challenge of monetary business cycle theory
is to generate important nonneutralities not by assumption,
but as an equilibrium outcome.
The ﬁrst monetary business cycle model along these
lines was developed by Lucas and Rapping (1969). This
model was later extended into a fully articulated general
equilibrium model by Lucas (1972). Two elements in the
Lucas-Rapping model generate cyclical ﬂuctuations: inter-
temporal substitution of leisure and unexpected changes in
wages. The basic idea in the Lucas-Rapping model is that
agents’ decisions are based on the realization of the real
wage relative to its normal, or expected, level. Suppose
that the wage turns out to be temporarily high today rel-
ative to its expected level. Since the wage is high, the op-
portunity cost of not working—leisure—is also high. If
preferences are such that leisure today is substitutable with
leisure in the future, households will respond by intertem-
porally substituting leisure today for future leisure and,
thus, will work more today to take advantage of the tem-porarily high wage. Similarly, if the wage today is tempo-
rarily low relative to the normal wage, households will
tend to take more leisure today and less leisure in the fu-
ture when wages return to normal.
How does the money supply in the 1929–33 decline
ﬁgure into this model? Lucas and Rapping (1969) model
households’ expectation ofthe real wage as aweighted av-
erage of the real wage’s past values. Based on this con-
struction of the weighted average, the rapid decline in the
money supply resulted in the real wage falling below its
expectedlevel,beginningin1930.Accordingtothemodel,
the decline in the real wage relative to the expected wage
led households to work less, which reduced output.
. . . But Not for the Recovery
Quantitatively, Lucas and Rapping (1969) ﬁnd that the
decline in the real wage relative to the expected wage was
important in the 1929–33 decline. The Lucas-Rapping
model predicts a large decline in labor input through
1933. The problem for the Lucas-Rapping model is what
happened after 1933. The real wage returned to its ex-
pected level in 1934, and for the rest of the decade, the
wage was either equal to or above its expected level. Ac-
cording to the model, this should have resulted in a re-
covery that quickly returned output to its 1929 (detrended)
level. This did not happen. (See Lucas and Rapping
1972.) The Lucas-Rapping (1969) model can’t account for
the weak recovery.
Another model that connects changes in money to
changes in output is Fisher’s (1933) debt-deﬂation model.
In this model, deﬂation shifts wealth from debtors to cred-
itors by increasing the real value of nominal liabilities. In
addition to making this wealth transfer, the increase in the
real value of liabilities reduces net worth and, according to
Fisher, leads to lower lending and a higher rate of business
failures. Qualitatively, Fisher’s view matches up with the
1929–32 period, in which both nominal prices and output
werefalling.Thequantitativeimportanceofthedebt-deﬂa-
tion mechanism for this period, however, is an open ques-
tion. Of course, Fisher’s model would tend to predict a
rapid recovery in economic activity once nominal prices
stoppedfallingin1933.Thus,Fisher’smodelcan’taccount
for the weak recovery either.
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Alternative Factors
Factors other than those considered important in postwar
business cycles have been cited as important contributors
to the 1929–33 decline. Do any provide a satisfactory ac-
counting for the Depression from the perspective of neo-
classical theory? We examine two widely cited factors:
ﬁnancial intermediation shocks and inﬂexible nominal
wages.
Were Financial Intermediation Shocks Important?
Bank Failures? Maybe, But Only Brieﬂy
Several economists have argued that the large number of
bank failures that occurred in the early 1930s disrupted ﬁ-
nancial intermediation and that this disruption was a key
factorinthedecline.Bernanke’s(1983)workprovidesem-
pirical support for this argument. He constructs a statistical
model, based on Lucas and Rapping’s (1969) model, in
which unexpected changes in the money stock lead to
changes in output. Bernanke estimates the parameters of
hismodelusingleastsquares,andheshowsthataddingthe
dollar value of deposits and liabilities of failing banks as
explanatoryvariablessigniﬁcantlyincreasesthefractionof
output variation the model can account for.
What economic mechanism might have led bank fail-
urestodeepenthe1929–33decline?Oneviewisthatthese
failures represented a decline in information capital asso-
ciated with speciﬁc relationships between borrowers and
intermediaries. Consequently, when a bank failed, this re-
lationship-speciﬁccapitalwaslost,andtheefficiencyofin-
termediation declined.
It is difficult to assess the quantitative importance of
bank failures as a factor in deepening the 1929–33 decline
becausethe outputof thebankingsector, likebroader mea-
sures of economic activity, is an endogenous, not an ex-
ogenous, variable. Although bank failures may have exac-
erbated the decline, as suggested by Bernanke’s (1983)
empirical work, some of the decline in the inputs and out-
put of the banking sector may also have been an endoge-
nous response to the overall decline in economic activity.
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Moreover,bankfailureswerecommonintheUnitedStates
during the 1920s, and most of those bank failures did not
seem to have important aggregate consequences. Wicker
(1980) and White (1984) argue that at least some of the
failuresduringtheearly1930sweresimilartothoseduring
the 1920s.
However, we can assess the potential contribution of
intermediation shocks to the 1929–33 decline with the fol-
lowing growth accounting exercise. We can easily show
that under the assumption of perfect competition, at least
locally, the percentage change in aggregate output, Y ˆ, can
be written as a linear function of the percentage change in
the sector i outputs, y ˆi, for each sector i = 1, ..., n and the
shares gi for each sector as follows:
(5) Y ˆ =
n
i=1giy ˆi.
The share of the entire ﬁnance, insurance, and real estate
(FIRE) sector went from 13 percent in 1929 to 11 percent
in 1933. This suggests that the appropriate cost share was
12 percent. The real output of the FIRE sector dropped 39
percent between 1929 and 1933. If we interpret this fall as
exogenous, we see that the drop in the entire FIRE sector
reduces output by 4.7 percent. Thus, in the absence of
large aggregate externalities that would amplify this effect,
the contribution of the FIRE sector was small.
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To better understand the importance of bank failures,
especially for the recovery, we next examine data on ﬁ-
nancial intermediation during the Depression to determine
how the capacity of the banking sector changed as a result
of exiting institutions; how the quantity of one productive
input into the banking sector, deposits, changed; and how
the portfolios of banks changed.
In Table 10, we present data on deposits in operating
banks,depositsinsuspendedbanks,the stockoftotalcom-
mercial loans, and federal government securities held by
banks. All data are measured relative to nominal output.
To measure the ﬂow change in loans, we also present the
percentage change in the ratio of loans to output. We note
four interesting features of these data.
• The decline in deposits during the 1929–33 decline
was small relative to the decline in output. The ratio
of deposits of operating banks to output rose from
0.57 in 1929 to 0.77 in 1932.• Deposits of suspended institutions were less than 2
percentofdepositsofoperatingbanksineveryyearof
the decline except 1933, when the president declared
a national bank holiday. Moreover, failures disap-
peared after 1933, reﬂecting the introduction of fed-
eral deposit insurance.
• Loans as a fraction of output did not begin to drop
much until 1933, but dropped sharply during the
1934–39 recovery.
• The fraction of federal government securities held by
banks as a fraction of output increased steadily during
the Depression, rising from 0.05 in 1929 to 0.20 by
1935.
The data in the ﬁrst two rows of Table 10 suggest that
funds available for loans were relatively high during the
Depression and that the overall capacity of the banking
sector, measured in terms of deposits lost in exiting insti-
tutions, did not change much. Why, then, did banks not
make more loans during the Depression? Was it because
a loss of information capital associated with exiting banks
causeda reductionintheefficiency ofintermediation?Un-
fortunately, we can’t measure this information capital di-
rectly. We can, however, assess this possibility with a very
simple model of intermediation, in which loans made at
banki,li,andintermediatedgovernmentdebtheldbybank
i, bi,are produced from a constant returns to scale technol-
ogy using deposits, di,and exogenous information capital,
xi,such that li+bi=f(di,xi). The total stock of information
capital is the sum of information capital across all banks,
and the information capital of any bank that exits is de-
stroyed. With competition, the ratio of productive inputs,
di/xi, will be identical across banks. This implies that the
fraction of information capital in banking lost due to ex-
iting banks is equal to the fraction of deposits lost in ex-
iting banks. Theorythus suggests that, exceptduring 1933,
the loss of information capital as a direct result of exiting
banks was low during the Depression.
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Thereare otherchannels, however,throughwhich bank
failures could have had important aggregate affects. For
example, failures caused by bank runs may have led sol-
vent banks to fear runs and, therefore, shift their portfolios
from illiquid loans to liquid government bonds. However,
this shift doesn’t explain the low level of loans relative to
output that persisted during the 1934–39 recovery. More-
over, during the recovery, federal deposit insurance elim-
inated bank runs. Why would banks still fear runs years
later?
This analysis raises some questions about the view that
bank runs had very large effects during the 1929–33 de-
cline. It also shows that there is little evidence to support
the view that the intermediation shock associated with
these bank runs had persistent effects which slowed the
recovery after 1933. We next turn to the other intermedi-
ation shock that some researchers argue is important for
understanding the weak recovery.
Reserve Requirements? Not Much
In August 1936, the Federal Reserve increased the re-
quired fraction of net deposits that member banks must
hold as reserves from 10 percent to 15 percent. This frac-
tion rose to 17.5 percent in March 1937 and then rose to
20 percent in May 1937. Many economists, for example,
Friedman and Schwartz, attribute some of the weak mac-
roeconomic performance during 1937 and 1938 to these
policy changes.
These economists argue that these policy changes in-
creased bank reserves, which reduced lending and, con-
sequently, reduced output. If this were true, we would ex-
pect to see output fall shortly after these changes. This did
not happen. Between August 1936, when the ﬁrst increase
took place, and August 1937, industrial production rose
about 12 percent. It is worth noting that industrial produc-
tion did fall considerably between late 1937 and 1938, but
the downturn did not begin until October 1937, which is
14 months after the ﬁrst and largest increase in reserve re-
quirements. (Industrial production data are from the Octo-
ber 1943 Federal Reserve Index of Industrial Production
oftheBoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem.)
Another potential shortcoming of the reserve require-
ment view is that interest rates did not rise after these pol-
icy changes. Commercial loan rates fell from 2.74 percent
in January 1936 to 2.65 percent in August 1936. These
rates then fell to 2.57 percent in March 1937 and rose
slightly to 2.64 percent in May 1937, the date of the last
increaseinreserverequirements.Lendingratesthenranged
between 2.48 percent and 2.60 percent over the rest of
1937 and through 1938. Interest rates on other securities
showed similar patterns: rates on Aaa-, Aa-, and A-rated
corporate debtwere roughly unchanged between 1936 and
1938.
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Statistics, 1914–1941 of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.) These data raise questions about
the view that higher reserve requirements had important
macroeconomic effects in the late 1930s and instead sug-
gest that some other factor was responsible for the weak
1934–39 recovery.
Were Inﬂexible Nominal Wages Important?
Hard to Know
The other alternative factor cited as contributing to the
Depression is inﬂexible nominal wages. This view dates
back to Keynes 1935 and more recently to Bernanke and
Carey 1996 and Bordo, Erceg, and Evans 1996. The basic
idea behind this view is that nominal wages are inﬂexi-
ble—a decline in the money supply lowers the price level
but does not lower the nominal wage. This inﬂexibility
suggests that a decline in the price level raises the real
wage and, consequently, reduces labor input. Were in-
ﬂexible nominal wages a key factor in the Depression?
To address this question, in Table 11, we present data
on real wages in manufacturing, nonmanufacturing, and
the total economy. The data for the manufacturing sector,
from Hanes 1996, are divided by the GNP deﬂator, ad-
justed for long-run real wage growth of 1.9 percent per
year, and measured relative to 1929. The wage rate for the
total economy is constructed as real total compensation of
employees divided by total hours worked. The total econ-
omy rate is also adjusted for long-run real wage growth
and measured relative to 1929.
We use the data for the manufacturing wage, the con-
structed total economy wage, and the employment shares
for manufacturing and nonmanufacturing to construct the
wagerateforthenonmanufacturingsector.Thepercentage
change in the total wage (%Dw
tot) between dates t and t −
1 is equal to the sum of the percentage change in the
manufacturing wage (%Dw
mfg) weighted by its share of
employment (shm) at date t− 1 and the percentage changein the nonmanufacturing sector weighted by its share of
employment at date t − 1. Thus, the percentage change in
the nonmanufacturing wage (%Dw






The economywide real wage was roughly unchanged
during 1930 and 1931, and fell 9 percent by 1933. This ag-
gregate measure, however, masks striking differences be-
tween the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors.
The nonmanufacturing wage fell almost 15 percent be-
tween 1929 and 1933 and remained almost 10 percent be-
low trend in 1939. This decline was not unusual: postwar
data indicate that real wages are moderately procyclical,
which suggests that the large drop in output during the
1929–33 decline would likely have been accompanied by
a considerable drop in the real wage.
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In contrast, real wages in manufacturing rose above
trend during the 1929–33 decline and continued to rise
during the rest of the decade. By 1939, manufacturing
wages were 16 percent above trend. These data raise ques-
tions about the manufacturing sector during the Depres-
sion. Why did real wages in manufacturing rise so much
during a decade of poor economic performance? Why was
the increase only in manufacturing? It seems unlikely that
thestandardreasonsfornominal wageinﬂexibility—mon-




We conclude that neither alternative factor, intermedia-
tion shocks or inﬂexible nominal wages, sheds much light
on the weak 1934–39 recovery.
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A Possible Solution
Neoclassical theory indicates that the Depression—partic-
ularly the recovery between 1934 and 1939—is a puzzle.
The conventional shocks considered important in postwar
business cycles do not account for the decade-long drop in
employment and output. The conventional shocks are too
small. Moreover, the effects of monetary shocks are too
transient. Nor does expanding our analysis to consider al-
ternative factors account for the Depression. The effects of
alternative factors either are too transient or lack a suffi-
cient theoretical framework.
Where do we go from here? To make progress in un-
derstanding the Depression, we identify the observations
that are puzzling from the neoclassical perspective and
then determine which direction these puzzles point us in.
Our analysis identiﬁes three puzzles in particular: Why did
labor input, consumption, and investment remain so low
during a period of rapid productivity growth? Why did ag-
ricultural employment and output remain near trend levels
during the early 1930s, while nonagricultural employment
and output plummeted? Why did the manufacturing real
wage increase so much during the 1930s? With competi-
tive markets, theory suggests that the real wage should
have decreased, rather than increased.
Thesepuzzlessuggest thatsomeothershockswerepre-
venting a normal recovery. We uncover three clues that
may aid in future hunts for the shocks that account for the
weak 1934–39 recovery. First, it seems that we can rule
out shocks that hit all sectors of the economy proportion-
ately. During the 1929–33 decline, for example, agricul-
tural employment and output fell very little, while manu-
facturing output and employment fell substantially. Sec-
ond, our view that the economy was settling on a new,
much lower growth path during the 1930s indicates that
the shocks responsible for the decline were perceived by
households and businesses to be permanent, rather than
temporary.Third,someofthepuzzlesmayberelated—the
fact that investment remained so low may reﬂect the fact
that the capital stock was adjusting to a new, lower steady-
state growth path.
To account for the weak recovery, these clues suggest
that we look for shocks with speciﬁc characteristics, for
example, a large shock which hits just some sectors of the
economy, in particular, manufacturing, and which causes
wages to rise and employment and investment to fall in
those sectors. We conjecture that government policies to-
ward monopoly and the distribution of income are a good
candidate for this type of shock.
Government policies toward monopoly changed con-
siderably in the 1930s. In particular, the NIRA of 1933
allowed much of the U.S. economy to cartelize. For over
500 sectors, including manufacturing, antitrust law was
suspended and incumbent business leaders, in conjunction
with government and labor representatives in each sector,
drew up codes of fair competition. Many of these codes
provided for minimum prices, output quotas, and open
pricesystemsinwhichallﬁrmshadtoreportcurrentprices
to the code authority and any price cut had to be ﬁled in
advance with the authority, who then notiﬁed other pro-
ducers. Firms that attempted to cut prices were pressured
by other industry members and publicly berated by the
head of the NIRA as “cut-throat chiselers.” In return for
government-sanctioned collusion, ﬁrms gave incumbent
workers large pay increases.
How might this policy change have affected the econo-
my?Bypermittingmonopolyandraisingwages,theNIRA
would be expected to have depressed employment, output,
and investment in the sectors the act covered, including
manufacturing.Incontrast,economicactivityinthesectors
notcoveredbythe act,suchasagriculture, wouldprobably
not have declined as much. Qualitatively, this intuition
suggests that this government policy shock has the right
characteristics. The key issue, however, is the quantitative
impactoftheNIRAonthemacroeconomy:Howmuchdid
it change employment, investment, consumption, output,
and wages?How did theimpact differ acrosssectors of the
economy? Addressing these questions is the focus of our
current research.
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1For other studies of the Depression and many additional references, see Brunner
1981; Temin 1989, 1993; Eichengreen 1992; Calomiris 1993; Margo 1993; Romer
1993; Bernanke 1995; Bordo, Erceg, and Evans 1996; and Crucini and Kahn 1996.
2The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) deﬁnes a cyclical decline,
or recession, asa period ofdecline in outputacross manysectors of theeconomy which
typically lasts at least six months. Since the NBER uses a monthly frequency, we con-
vert to a quarterly frequency for our comparison by considering a peak (trough) quarter
to be the quarter with the highest (lowest) level of output within one quarter of thequarter that contains the month of the NBER peak (trough). We deﬁne the recovery as
the time it takes for output to return to its previous peak.
3Note that in the closed economy framework of the neoclassical growth model,
savings equals investment.
4We end our analysis in 1939 to avoid the effects of World War II.
5We make the trend adjustment by dividing each variable by its long-run trend
growth rate relative to the reference date. For example, we divide GNP in 1930 by
1.019. This number is 1 plus the average growth rate of 1.9 percent over the 1947–97
period andover the 1919–29period. For1931, wedivide the variableby 1.019
2,and so
forth.
6To obtain this measure, we divide per capita output in 1939 by per capita output
in 1929 (0.89) and divide the result by 1.019
10.
7This point is ﬁrst stressed in Hall 1978.
8Kendrick’s (1961) data for output are very similar to those in the NIPA.
9Hours will be constant along the steady-state growth path if preferences and tech-
nology satisfy certain properties. See King, Plosser, and Rebelo 1988.
10The average ratio of employment in 1939 to employment in 1929 was one in
these countries, indicating that employment had recovered.
11Cooley 1995 contains detailed discussions of computing the solution to the sto-
chastic growth model.





a higher capital share would imply for the 1934–39 recovery, we conducted our recov-
ery exercise assuming a capital share of two-thirds rather than one-third. While slower,
the recovery was still much faster than in the data. This exercise predicted output at 90
percent of trend by 1936 and at 95 percent of trend by 1939.
13BernankeandParkinson(1991)estimatereturnstoscaleforsomemanufacturing
industriesduringtheDepression andalsoﬁndevidence thatproductivityfell duringthis
period. They attribute at least some of the decline to mismeasurement of capital input
or increasing returns.
14An extreme approach to evaluating the effects of idle capital on total factor pro-
ductivity measurement is to assume that output is produced from a Leontief technology
usingcapitalandlabor.UnderthisLeontiefassumption,thepercentagedeclineincapital
services is equal to the percentage decline in labor services. Total hours drop 27.4 per-
cent between 1929 and 1933. Under the Leontief assumption, total factor productivity
in 1933 is about 7 percent below trend, compared to the 14 percent decline under the
opposite extreme view that all capital is utilized. This adjustment from a 14 percent de-
cline to a 7 percent decline is almost surely too large not only because it is based on a
Leontief technology, but also because it does not take into account the possibility that
the capital left idle during the decline was of lower quality than the capital kept in op-
eration.
15One reason that private investment may have fallen in the 1930s is because gov-
ernment investment was substituting for private investment; however, this seems un-
likely.Governmentinvestmentthatmightbeaclosesubstituteforprivateinvestmentdid
not rise in the 1930s: government expenditures on durable goods and structures were 3
percent of output in 1929 and ﬂuctuated between 3 percent and 4 percent of output dur-
ing the 1930s.
16To understand why a trade disruption would have such a small effect on output
ina countrywithasmalltrade share,considerthefollowing example.Assumethatﬁnal
goodsareproducedwithbothdomestic(Z)andforeign(M)intermediategoodsandthat
the prices of all goods are normalized to one. Assuming an elasticity of substitution be-





where a is the share parameter for intermediate inputs. This assumption implies that
with the level of domestic intermediate goods held ﬁxed,
%DY = (1−a)%DM.
That fact that U.S. imports were 4 percent of total output and U.S. exports 5 percent in
1929 suggests that the highest the cost share of inputs in production could have been is
0.04/0.95 0.04. Hence, an extreme disruption in trade that led to an 80 percent drop
in imports would lead to only a 3.2 percent drop in output. (See Crucini and Kahn 1996
for more on this issue.)
17Note that the monetary base, which is the components of M1 controlled by the
Federal Reserve, grew between 1929 and 1933.
18In addition to Lucas and Rapping’s (1969) ﬁndings and Fisher’s (1933) debt-
deﬂation view, we have other reasons to question the monetary shock view of the De-
pression. During the mid- and late-1930s, business investment remained more than 50
percent below its 1929 level despite short-term real interest rates (commercial paper)
near zero and long-term real interest rates (Baa corporate bonds) at or below long-run
averages.Theseobservationssuggestthatsomeotherfactorwasimpedingtherecovery.
19Bernanke (1983) acknowledges the possibility of an endogenous response but
argues that it was probably not important, since problems in ﬁnancial intermediation
tended to precede the decline in overall activity and because some of the bank failures
seem to have been due to contagion or events unrelated to the overall downturn.
Recent work by Calomiris and Mason (1997) raises questions about the view that
bank runs reﬂected contagion and raises the possibility that productive, as well as un-
productive,bankscouldberun.CalomirisandMasonanalyzethebankpanicinChicago
in June 1932 and ﬁnd that most of the failures were among insolvent, or near-insolvent,
banks.





Note also that if goods are produced competitively, then the price of each factor i is
given by its marginal product Fi. Hence, gi = Fiyi/Y, and the result follows.
Note that the fact that the cost shares didn’t change very much is inconsistent with
the notion that there was extremely low elasticity of substitution for this input and that
thefallinthisinputwasanimportantcauseofthefallinoutput.Forexample,aLeontief
production function in which F(y1, ..., yn) = miniyi implies that the cost share of input
yi would go to one if that input was the input in short supply.
21Cooperand Corbae (1997) develop anexplicit model of a ﬁnancial collapse with
a high output equilibrium associated with high levels of intermediation services and a
lowoutputequilibriumassociatedwithlowlevelsofintermediationservicesandasharp
reductioninthesizeofthebankingsector.Theirmodelalsoimpliesthattheratiooftotal
deposits to output is a measure of the available level of intermediation services.
22Interest rates on Baa debt, which is considered by investment bankers to have
higher default risk than these other debts, did begin to rise in late 1937 and 1938.
23While Kendrick’s (1961) data on aggregate hours are frequently used in macro-
economic analyses of the pre–World War II economy, we point out that the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) did not estimate broad coverage of hours until the 1940s. Thus,
Kendrick’s data are most likely of lower quality than the more recent BLS data.
24Decade-long money illusion is hard to reconcile with maximizing behavior. Re-
gardingnominalcontracts,weareunawareofanyevidencethatexplicitlong-termnom-
inal wage contracts were prevalent in the 1930s. This prevalence would seem unlikely,
since only about 11 percent of the workforce was unionized in the early 1930s.
25Alternative views in the literature combine a variety of shocks. Romer (1990,
1992) suggests that the 1929 stock market crash increased uncertainty, which led to a
sharp decline in consumption. She argues that this shock, combined with monetary fac-
tors,isakeytounderstandingthe1930s.ToassessRomer’sview,whichisbasedinpart
on the large drop in stock prices, we need a well-established theory of assetpricing. Ex-
istingtheoriesofassetpricing,however,donotconformclosely tothedata.(SeeGross-
manandShiller1981orMehraandPrescott1985.)Givenexistingtheory,aneoclassical
evaluation of Romer’s view is difficult.
Appendix
The Neoclassical Growth Model
Herewedescribetheneoclassicalgrowthmodel,whichprovides
the theoretical framework in the preceding paper.
Theneoclassicalgrowthmodelhasbecometheworkhorseof
macroeconomics, public ﬁnance, and international economics.
The widespread use of this model in aggregate economics re-
ﬂects its simplicity and the fact that its long-run predictions for
output, consumption, investment, and shares of income paid to
capital and labor conform closely to the long-run experience of
the United States and other developed countries.
Themodelincludestwoconstructs.Oneisaproductionfunc-
tion with constant returns to scale and smooth substitution pos-
sibilities between capital and labor inputs. Output is either con-
sumedorsavedtoaugmentthecapitalstock.Theotherconstruct
is a representative household which chooses a sequence of con-
sumption,savings,andleisuretomaximizethepresentdiscount-
ed value of utility.
1
The basic version of the model can be written as maximizing
the lifetime utility of a representative household which is en-
dowed initially with k0 units of capital and one unit of time at
each date. Time can be used for work to produce goods (nt)o r
for leisure (lt). The objective function is maximized subject to a
sequenceofconstraintsthatrequiresufficientoutput[f(kt,nt)]to
ﬁnance the sum of consumption (ct) and investment (it) at each
date. Eachunitofdatetoutputthat isinvestedaugmentsthedate
t + 1 capital stock by one unit. The capital stock depreciates
geometrically at rate d, and b is the household’s discount factor.





subject to the following conditions:
(A2) f(kt,nt) ³ ct + it(A3) it = kt+1 − (1−d)kt
(A4) 1 = nt + lt
(A5) ct ³ 0, nt ³ 0, kt+1 ³ 0.
Under standard conditions, an interior optimum exists for this
problem. (See Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott 1989.) The optimal
quantities satisfy the following two ﬁrst-order conditions at each
date:
(A6) ult = uctf2(kt,nt)
(A7) uct = buct+1[f1(kt+1,nt+1) + (1−d)].
Equation (A6) characterizes the trade-off between taking lei-
sure and working by equating the marginal utility of leisure, ult,
to the marginal beneﬁt of working, which is working one ad-
ditional unit and consuming the proceeds: uctf2(kt,nt). Equation
(A7) characterizes the trade-off between consuming one ad-
ditional unit today and investing that unit and consuming the
proceeds tomorrow. This trade-off involves equating the mar-
ginal utility of consumption today,uct,to the discounted margin-
al utility of consumption tomorrow and multiplying by the mar-
ginal product of capital tomorrow. This version of the model has
a steady state in which all variables converge to constants. To
introduce steady-state growth into this model, the production
technology is modiﬁed to include labor-augmenting technologi-
cal change, xt:
(A8) xt+1 = (1+g)xt
where the variable xt represents the efficiency of labor input,
which is assumed to grow at the constant rate g over time. The
production function is modiﬁed to be f(kt,xtnt). King, Plosser,
and Rebelo (1988) show that relative to trend growth, this ver-
sion of the model has a steady state and has the same character-
istics as the model without growth.
This very simple framework, featuring intertemporal opti-
mization,capitalaccumulation,andanaggregateproductionfunc-
tion, is the foundation of many modern business cycle models.
For example, models with technology shocks start with this
framework and add a stochastic disturbance to the production
technology. In this case, the resource constraint becomes
(A9) ztf(kt,nt) ³ ct + it
where zt is a random variable that shifts the production function.
Fluctuationsinthetechnologyshockaffectthemarginalproducts
of capital and labor and, consequently, lead to ﬂuctuations in al-
locations and relative prices. (See Prescott 1986 for details.)
Modelswithgovernmentspendingshocksstartwiththebasic
framework and add stochastic government purchases. In this
case, the resource constraint is modiﬁed as follows:
(A10) f(kt,nt) ³ ct + it + gt
where gt is stochastic government purchases. An increase in
government purchases reduces output available for private use.
Thisreductioninprivateresourcesmakeshouseholdspoorerand
leadsthemtoworkmore.(SeeChristianoandEichenbaum1992
and Baxter and King 1993 for details.)
Because these economies do not have distortions, such as
distorting taxes or money, the allocations obtained as the so-
lution to the maximization problem are also competitive equi-
librium allocations. (See Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott 1989.) The
solution to the optimization problem can be interpreted as the
competitive equilibrium of an economy with a large number of
identical consumers, all of whom start with k0 units of capital,
and a large number of ﬁrms, all of whom have access to the
technology f(k,n) for transforming inputs into output. The equi-
librium consists of rental prices for capital rt= f1(kt,nt) and labor
wt = f2(kt,nt) and the quantities of consumption, labor, and in-
vestment at each date t = 0, ..., ¥. In this economy, the repre-
sentative consumer’s budget constraint is given by
(A11) rtkt + wtnt ³ ct + it.
Theconsumer’sobjectiveistomaximizethevalueofdiscounted
utility subject to the consumer’s budget constraint and the tran-
sition rule for capital (A3). The ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize
the value of proﬁts at each date. Proﬁts are given by
(A12) f(kt,nt)−rtkt − wtnt.
The effects of monetary disturbances can also be studied in
the neoclassical growth framework by introducing money into
themodel.Theintroductionofmoney,however,representsadis-
tortion; consequently, the competitive equilibrium will not gen-
erally coincide with the solution to the optimization problem.
(See Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott 1989.) In this case, the equa-
tionsforthecompetitiveequilibrium,ratherthantheoptimization
problem, are used in the analysis.
One widely used approach to adding money to the equilibri-
um model is to introduce a cash-in-advance constraint, which
requires that consumption be purchased with cash:
(A13) mt ³ ptct
where mt is the money supply and pt is the price (in dollars) of
the physical good. In this model, changes in the money stock
affectexpectedinﬂation,which,inturn,changeshouseholds’in-
centives to work and thus leads to ﬂuctuations in labor input.
(See Cooley and Hansen 1989 for details.) More-complex mon-
etary models, including models with imperfectly ﬂexible prices
or wages or imperfect information about the stock of money,
also use the basic model as a foundation.
1Solow’s (1956) original version of this model features a representative agent who
inelastically supplies one unit of labor and who consumes and saves a ﬁxed fraction of
output. Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) replace the ﬁxed savings formulation of
Solow with an optimizing representative consumer.
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The Recession of 1921:
The Recovery Puzzle Deepens
Many economists, including Friedman and Schwartz (1963),
view the 1921 economic downturn as a classic monetary re-
cession. Under this view, the 1921 recession and subsequent
recovery support our view in the accompanying article that
the weak 1934–39 recovery is puzzling.
In 1921, the monetary base fell 9 percent, reﬂecting
Federal Reserve policy which was intended to reduce the
price level from its World War I peak. This decline is the
largest one-year drop in the monetary base in the history of
the United States. The price level did fall considerably, de-
clining 18.5 percent in 1921. Real per capita output also fell
in 1921, declining 3.4 percent relative to trend.
Since many economists assume that monetary factors
were important in both the 1929–33 decline and the 1921 re-
cession, we compare these two downturns and their recov
pricelevel normalizedto100in theyear beforethedownturn
and normalized detrended real per capita output.
Therearetwokeydifferencesbetweentheseperiods.One
is that the decrease in output relative to the decrease in the
price level during the 1920s is small compared to the de-
crease in output relative to the decrease in the price level that
occurred during the 1930s. The 18.5 percent decrease in the
price level in 1921 is more than ﬁve times as large as the 3.4
percent decrease in output in 1921. In contrast, the decrease
in the price level is only about 62 percent of the average de-
creaseinoutputbetween1929and1933.Theotherdifference
is that the 1921 recession was followed by a fast recovery.
Evenbeforethepricelevelceasedfalling,theeconomybegan
to recover. Once the price level stabilized, the economy grew
rapidly. Real per capita output was about 8 percent above
trend by 1923, and private investment was nearly 70 percent
aboveits1921levelin1923.Thispatternisqualitativelycon-
sistent with the predictions of monetary business cycle the-
ory:adropinoutputinresponsetothepriceleveldecline,fol-
lowed immediately by a signiﬁcant recovery.
In contrast, the end of the deﬂation after 1933 did not
bring about a fast recovery after the 1929–33 decline. This
comparison between these two declines and subsequent re-
coveries supports our view that weak post-1933 macroeco-
nomic performance is difficult to understand. The recovery
from the 1921 recession offers evidence that factors other
than monetary shocks prevented a normal recovery from the
1929–33 decline.A Strong vs. a Weak Recovery
Price Levels and Detrended Real Output







Sources: Kendrick 1961; Romer 1989











Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic AnalysisTable 1
Duration and Scale of the Depression
and Postwar Business Cycles
Measured by the Decline and Recovery of Output
Length Size of  Length of
of Decline Decline Recovery
Great Depression 4 years –31.0% 7 years
Postwar Cycle Average 1 year –2.9% 1.5 years
Sources: National Bureau of Economic Research; U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic AnalysisConsumption
Foreign Trade Real Nondurables Consumer Business Government
Year Output and Services Durables Investment Purchases Exports Imports
1930 87.3 90.8 76.2 69.2 105.1 85.2 84.9
1931 78.0 85.2 63.3 46.1 105.3 70.5 72.4
1932 65.1 75.8 46.6 22.2 97.2 54.4 58.0
1933 61.7 71.9 44.4 21.8 91.5 52.7 60.7
1934 64.4 71.9 48.8 27.9 100.8 52.7 58.1
1935 67.9 72.9 58.7 41.7 99.8 53.6 69.1
1936 74.7 76.7 70.5 52.6 113.5 55.0 71.7
1937 75.7 76.9 71.9 59.5 105.8 64.1 78.0
1938 70.2 73.9 56.1 38.6 111.5 62.5 58.3
1939 73.2 74.6 64.0 49.0 112.3 61.4 61.3
*Data are divided by the working-age (16 years and older) population.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
Table 2
Detrended Levels of Output and Its Components in 1929–39*
Index, 1929=100Table 3
Changes in the Composition of Output in 1929–39
Government
Year Consumption Investment Purchases Exports Imports
1929 .62 .25 .13 .05 .04
1930 .64 .19 .16 .05 .04
1931 .67 .15 .18 .05 .04
1932 .72 .08 .19 .04 .04
1933 .72 .09 .19 .04 .04
1934 .69 .11 .20 .04 .04
1935 .66 .15 .19 .04 .04
1936 .63 .17 .20 .04 .04
1937 .63 .19 .18 .04 .04
1938 .65 .14 .21 .04 .04
1939 .63 .16 .20 .04 .04
Postwar Average .59 .20 .23 .06 .07
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
Shares of Output
Foreign TradeTable 4 
Detrended Levels of Output and Its Components
in a Typical Postwar Recovery
Measured Quarterly From Trough, Peak=100
Quarters Government
From Trough Output Consumption Investment Purchases
0 95.3 96.8 84.5 98.0
1 96.2 98.1 85.2 97.9
2 98.3 99.5 97.3 98.0
3 100.2 100.8 104.5 99.0
4 102.1 102.7 112.1 99.2
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic AnalysisTable 5
Five Measures of Labor Input in 1929–39*
Index, 1929=100
Aggregate Measures Sectoral Measures
Total Total Private Farm Manufacturing
Year Employment Hours Hours Hours† Hours
1930 93.2 91.9 91.5 99.0 84.6
1931 85.7 83.5 82.8 101.7 68.7
1932 77.5 73.4 72.4 98.7 54.7
1933 76.2 72.6 70.8 99.0 58.4
1934 79.9 71.7 68.7 89.3 61.2
1935 81.4 74.7 71.4 93.3 68.6
1936 83.9 80.6 75.8 91.1 79.2
1937 86.4 83.0 79.5 99.1 85.3
1938 80.4 76.3 71.7 92.7 67.6
1939 82.1 78.7 74.4 93.6 78.0
*Data are divided by the working-age (16 years and older) population.
†Farm hours are adjusted for a secular decline in farm employment of about 1.8 percent per year.
Source: Kendrick 1961Table 6














*Labor productivity is deﬁned as output per hour.
Sources: Kendrick 1961; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic AnalysisTable 7
U.S. vs. International Decline and Recovery








*International average includes Belgium, Britain, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, and Sweden.
Source: Maddison 1991Table 8
Nominal Money, Prices, and Interest Rates in 1929–39
Annual % Interest Rate
Monetary Price 3-Month Commercial
Year Base* M1* Level U.S. T-Bill Paper
1929 100.0 100.0 100.0 4.4% 6.1%
1930 95.9 94.4 97.0 2.2 4.3
1931 98.7 85.6 88.1 1.2 2.6
1932 104.3 74.5 78.4 .8 2.7
1933 108.9 69.9 76.7 .3 1.7
1934 119.8 78.0 83.2 .3 2.0
1935 139.2 91.0 84.8 .2 .8
1936 157.2 102.1 85.2 .1 .8
1937 168.5 102.9 89.4 .5 .9
1938 181.5 102.2 87.2 .1 .8
1939 215.5 113.7 86.6 .0 .6
*Money measures are divided by the working-age (16 years and older) population.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemTable 9
Real Money, Output, and Interest Rates in 1929–39
Monetary Interest
Year Base* M1* Output Rate†
1929 100.0 100.0 100.0 6.0%
1930 98.8 97.3 87.3 7.3
1931 112.0 97.1 78.0 11.8
1932 133.1 95.1 65.1 13.8
1933 142.1 91.2 61.7 3.9
1934 144.0 93.8 64.4 –6.5
1935 164.1 107.3 67.9 –1.1
1936 184.4 119.8 74.7 .3
1937 188.6 115.2 75.7 –3.9
1938 208.1 117.2 70.2 3.2
1939 248.7 131.2 73.2 1.3
* Money measures are divided by the working-age (16 years and older) population.
†This is the interest rate on commercial paper minus the realized inﬂation rate.
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic AnalysisTable 10
Bank Assets and Liabilities Relative to Nominal Output in 1929–39
Deposits
Operating Suspended % Change Federal
Year Banks Banks Loans in Loans Securities
1929 .57 .00 .41 –6% .05
1930 .64 .01 .42 3 .06
1931 .62 .02 .48 13 .09
1932 .77 .01 .45 –6 .12
1933 .69 .06 .40 –13 .15
1934 .74 .00 .31 –23 .17
1935 .73 .00 .28 –11 .20
1936 .71 .00 .26 –9 .21
1937 .65 .00 .24 –6 .19
1938 .71 .00 .25 3 .20
1939 .73 .00 .25 –2 .21
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemTable 11
Detrended Real Wage Rates in 1929–39
Index, 1929=100
Total
Year Manufacturing Economy Nonmanufacturing
1930 101.6 99.1 97.6
1931 105.7 98.6 94.5
1932 105.0 97.0 92.6
1933 102.3 91.0 85.2
1934 108.5 95.5 88.1
1935 108.0 94.8 86.9
1936 106.9 97.3 91.4
1937 112.6 97.6 87.9
1938 117.0 98.9 86.9
1939 116.1 99.9 90.2
Source of basic data: Hanes 1996; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic AnalysisConsumption
Output
Chart 1
Convergence to a New Growth Path?
Detrended Levels
of Consumption and Output
in 1929–39
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis







Predicted and Actual Output in 1929–39
Detrended Levels, With Initial
Capital Stock in the Model
Equal to the Actual Capital Stock
in 1929
Source of basic data: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis












Predicted and Actual Recovery of Output in 1934–39
Detrended Levels, With Initial
Capital Stock in the Model
Equal to the Actual Capital Stock 
in 1934
Source of basic data: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
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